
Discuss Time Rider

Notes: As this story
focuses on the attack on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, here are
some facts of that historic attack.
According to wikipedia.org,
In 1924, General Billy Mitchell produced a 324 page report warning
that in future wars (including with Japan), would include a new role
for aircraft, against existing ships and facilities. He even
discussed the possibility of an air-attack on Pearl Harbor. He was
essentially ignored. Navy Secretary Knox had also appreciated the
possibility of an attack at Pearl in a written analysis shortly
after taking office. American commanders had also been warned that
tests had demonstrated shallow-water aerial torpedo launches were
possible, but no one in charge in Hawaii fully appreciated the
consequences. A war game surprise attack against Pearl Harbor a few
years earlier had been judged a success and to have caused
considerable damage.
Nevertheless, because they believed Pearl Harbor had natural
defenses against torpedo attack (e.g., the shallow water), the Navy
did not deploy torpedo nets or baffles, which were judged an
interference with ordinary operations. And as a result of limited
numbers of long-range aircraft (including Army Air Corps bombers,
available for search by a prewar arrangement), reconnaissance
patrols were not being made as often or as far out as required for
adequate coverage against possible surprise attack. The Navy had
only 16 operational PBYs long range aircraft. General Short was low
on the priority list for the B-17s finally becoming available for
the Pacific, since General MacArthur in the Philippines was
successfully demanding as many as could be made available there. At
the time of the attack, Army and Navy air defense were both on
training status rather than operational alert. There was also
confusion about the Army's readiness status as General Short had
changed the alert level designations without clearly informing
higher command (ie, Washington). Most of the Army's mobile
anti-aircraft guns were secured, with ammunition locked down in
armories. To avoid upsetting property owners, and in keeping with
Washington's admonition not to alarm civil populations (e.g., in the
late November war warning messages from the Navy and War
Departments), guns were not dispersed around Pearl Harbor (i.e., on
private property). Additionally, aircraft were parked on airfields
to lessen against sabotage risks, not air attack, in keeping with
Short's decision to concentrate on sabotage.
|