Discuss Time Rider
Notes: As this story
focuses on the attack on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, here are
some facts of that historic attack.
According to wikipedia.org,
Even before Nagumo began
launching, at 04.30 Hawaiian Time, the minesweeper USS Condor
spotted a midget submarine outside the Harbor entrance and alerted
USN destroyer Ward. Ward carried out an unsuccessful search. The
first shots fired and the first casualties in the attack on Pearl
Harbor, occurred when Ward eventually attacked and sank a midget
submarine, possibly the same one, at 06:37. Five Ko-hyoteki-class
midget submarines had been assigned to torpedo U.S. ships after the
bombing started. None of these made it back safely, and only four
out of the five have since been found. Of the ten sailors aboard the
five submarines, nine died; the only survivor, Kazuo Sakamaki, was
captured, becoming the first prisoner of war taken by the Americans
in World War II. Sakamaki's survival was considered traitorous by
many Japanese, who referred to his dead companions as "The Nine
Young Gods." United States Naval Institute analysis of photographs
from the attack, conducted in 1999, indicates that one of these
mini-subs entered the harbor and successfully fired a torpedo into
the West Virginia, in what may have been the first shot by the
attacking Japanese. The final disposition of that submarine is
unknown.[14]
The first wave of 1st Air Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy attack
was coordinated by Captain Mitsuo Fuchida of the Imperial Japanese
Navy Air Service. He flew and led the first strike formation
covering the right flank, followed by second wave led by
Lieutenant-Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki covering the left flank.
Captain Mitsuo FuchidaOn the morning of the attack, the Army's Opana
Point station (an SCR-270 radar, located near the northern tip of
Oahu, which had not entered official service, having been in
training mode for months), detected the first wave of Japanese
planes, but the warning it called in to the new and only partially
activated Intelligence Center in Honolulu was interpreted by an
untrained new officer (Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler) as B-17s.
Although the operators at Opana Point reported an aircraft echo
larger than anything they had ever seen, Tyler assumed the pending,
scheduled arrival of 6 B-17 bombers was the cause because of the
direction from which the aircraft were coming, and possibly because
the radar operators had only seen the first element of incoming
attackers. In addition, some commercial US shipping may have
reported "unusual" radio traffic in the preceding days.
Several U.S. aircraft were shot down as the first attack wave
approached land; one at least radioed a somewhat incoherent warning.
Other warnings were still being processed, or awaiting confirmation,
when the shooting began. It is not clear that these warnings that
morning could have had much effect even if they had been interpreted
correctly and much more promptly. For instance, the results the
Japanese achieved in the Philippines were essentially the same as at
Pearl Harbor, though MacArthur had had nine hours of warning that
the Japanese had attacked at Pearl (and specific orders to commence
operations) before they actually attacked.
The air portion of the attack on Pearl Harbor began at 7:53 a.m.
December 7 Hawaiian Time; this was 3:23 a.m. December 8 Japanese
Standard Time. Japanese planes attacked in two waves; a total of 353
planes reached Oʻahu. Slow, and vulnerable, torpedo bombers led the
first wave of 183 planes, exploiting the first moments of surprise
to attack the most important ships present (the battleships), while
dive bombers attacked U.S. air bases across Oʻahu, starting with
Hickam Field, the largest, and Wheeler Field, the principal fighter
base. The 170 planes in the second wave attacked Bellows Field and
Ford Island, a Marine and Naval air station in the middle of Pearl
Harbor. The only significant air opposition came from a handful of
P-36 Hawks and P-40 Warhawks that flew 25 sorties,[15] and may have
been shot down by naval anti-aircraft fire.
USS California sinkingMen aboard U.S. ships awoke to the sounds of
bombs exploding and cries of "Away fire and rescue party" and "All
hands on deck, we're being bombed" and other various calls to
General Quarters. (The famous message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor. This
is no drill." was broadcast by Commander Logan Ramsey from the
headquarters of Admiral Patrick Bellinger, commander of the PBY
squadron in Hawaii.) Despite the lack of preparation, which included
locked ammunition lockers, aircraft parked wing to wing to prevent
sabotage, and no heightened alert status, there were many American
military personnel who served with distinction during the battle.
Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, and Captain Franklin Van Valkenburgh,
commander of Arizona, both rushed to the bridge to direct her
defense, until both were killed by an explosion in the forward
ammunition magazine from an armor piercing bomb that hit next to
turret two. Both were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.
Ensign Joe Taussig got his ship, Nevada, under way from a dead cold
start during the attack. One of the destroyers, Aylwin, got underway
with only four officers aboard, all Ensigns, none with more than a
year's sea duty. That ship operated for four days at sea before her
commanding officer caught up with her. Captain Mervyn Bennion,
commanding West Virginia, led his men until he was cut down by
fragments from a bomb hit in Tennessee, moored alongside. The
earliest aircraft kill credit went to submarine Tautog. Probably the
most famous single defender is Doris "Dorie" Miller, an
African-American cook aboard West Virginia, who went beyond his duty
assignment and training when he took control of an unattended
anti-aircraft gun, on which he had no training, and used it to fire
on attacking planes, even while bombs were hitting his ship. He was
awarded the Navy Cross. In all, 14 sailors and officers were awarded
the Medal of Honor. A special military award, the Pearl Harbor
Commemorative Medal, was later authorized to all military veterans
of the attack.
B-17 Bomber after the attack on Hickam FieldNinety minutes after it
began, the attack was over. 2403 Americans died (68 were civilians,
many killed by American anti-aircraft shrapnel and shells landing in
civilian areas, including Honolulu), a further 1178 wounded.
Eighteen ships were sunk, including five battleships.[16]
USS Pennsylvania, behind the wreckage of the USS Downes and the USS
CassinNearly half of the American fatalities — 1,102 men — were
caused by the explosion and sinking of Arizona. She was destroyed
when the forward main magazines exploded after it was hit by a bomb
(a modified 40cm {16in} naval gun shell) dropped by Tadashi Kusumi
from a bomber. The hull of Arizona has become a memorial to those
lost that day, most of whom remain within the ship. She continues to
leak small amounts of fuel oil, 65 years after the attack.
Nevada attempted to exit the harbor, but was deliberately beached to
avoid blocking the harbor entrance. Already damaged by a torpedo and
on fire forward, Nevada was targeted by many Japanese bombers as she
got underway, sustaining more hits from 250 lb (113 kg) bombs as she
beached.
California was hit by two bombs and two torpedoes. The crew might
have kept her afloat, but were ordered to abandon ship just as they
were raising power for the pumps. Burning oil from Arizona and West
Virginia drifted down on her, and probably made the situation look
worse than it was. Their ship having been laid up, her band was
assigned to assist the cryptographers at station Hypo and its
commander thought they did well while they worked there. The
disarmed target ship Utah was holed twice by torpedoes. West
Virginia was hit by seven torpedoes, the seventh tearing away the
ship's rudder. Oklahoma was hit by four torpedoes, the last two
above her side armor belt which caused her to capsize. Maryland was
hit by two of the converted 40cm shells, but neither caused serious
damage.
Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships (the largest
vessels present), they did not ignore other targets. The light
cruiser Helena was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast
capsized the neighboring minelayer Oglala. Two destroyers in dry
dock were destroyed when bombs penetrated their bunkers. The leaking
fuel caught fire; flooding the dry dock in an effort to fight fire
made the burning oil and so the fire damage, rise which burned out
the ships. The light cruiser Raleigh was hit by a torpedo and holed.
The light cruiser Honolulu was damaged but remained in service. The
destroyer Cassin capsized, and destroyer Downes was heavily damaged.
The repair vessel Vestal, moored alongside Arizona, was heavily
damaged and beached. The seaplane tender Curtiss was also damaged.
Almost all of the 188 American aircraft in Hawaii were destroyed or
damaged, and 155 of those were hit on the ground where they were
parked in a sabotage risk reduction pattern. Almost none were
actually ready to take off in defense of the base. Attacks on
barracks killed additional pilots and other personnel. Friendly fire
brought down several U.S. planes (including at least one inbound
from Enterprise) which was heading for Pearl at the time of the
attack.
Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the
action. Of Japan's 441 available planes (350 took part in the
attack), 29 were lost during the battle (nine in the first attack
wave, 20 in the second),[17] with another 74 damaged by antiaircraft
fire from the ground. Over 20 of the aircraft that safely landed on
their carriers could not be salvaged.
The Third Wave
Some senior officers and flight leaders urged Nagumo to make a third
strike to destroy as much more of Pearl Harbor (eg, oil storage
depots, machine shops, dry docks, etc). The US Navy had considered
the vulnerability of the fuel oil storage before the war and
secretly started construction of the bomb resistant Red Hill
installation before the attack. Destruction of the oil still in
vulnerable tanks would have greatly increased the U.S. Navy's
difficulties, as the nearest immediately usable fleet facilities
were several thousand miles away, on America's West Coast. Some
military historians have suggested destruction of those oil tanks
and repair facilities would have crippled the Pacific Fleet more
seriously than loss of battleships. Nagumo decided to forgo a third
attack in favor of withdrawing for several reasons.
Anti-aircraft performance during the second strike was much improved
over the first, and two-thirds of Japan's losses were during the
second wave, because the Americans had been alerted. A third strike
would have suffered still worse losses.
The first two strikes had essentially used all the previously
prepared aircraft available, so a third strike would have taken time
to make ready, perhaps allowing the Americans time to find and
attack Nagumo's force. The location of the American carriers was and
remained unknown to Nagumo.
The Japanese had not practiced an attack against shore facilities
and organizing such an attack would have taken still more time,
though several of the strike leaders urged a third strike anyway.
The bunker fuel situation did not permit remaining on station north
much longer. The Japanese force was at the limit of its logistics
support. To remain in those waters for much longer would have risked
running unacceptably low on fuel.
The timing of a third strike meant aircraft would probably have to
recover after dark. Night operations from aircraft carriers were in
their infancy in 1941, and neither Japan nor anyone else had
developed reliable techniques and doctrine.
The second strike had essentially completed the entire mission:
neutralization of the Pacific Fleet.
There was the danger of remaining in one location too long. The
attack force was very fortunate to have escaped detection during its
voyage from the Inland Sea to Hawaii. The longer they remained near
Hawaii, the more danger they were in from American carriers.
The carriers were needed to support the main Japanese attack toward
the "Southern Resources Area" (i.e., the Philippines, the Dutch East
Indies, Malaya, and Burma) which was intended to capture control of
oil and other resources. Japanese leaders (especially the Army) had
been reluctant to allow the attack at all as it used air cover which
might be needed for the southern thrust; and Nagumo was under orders
not to risk his command any more than necessary.[citation needed]
War games during planning for the attack had predicted from two to
four carriers might be lost in the attack; that none had been even
attacked was a major bonus.
Yamamoto was not happy with Nagumo after the attack for not
launching a third attack, and for not destroying the US aircraft
carriers and the Pearl Harbor oil supply.
Additional U.S. losses on 23 December 1941
I-26 sank the Cynthia Olson, a U.S. Army chartered schooner, off the
coast of San Francisco with a loss of 35 lives.[6]
Subsequent Japanese attacks on Hawaii
Later during the war another small-scale attack was also made on
Pearl Harbor.
In March, 1942, in Operation K-1, a preparation for the Midway
invasion, two Japanese H8K flying-boats, based at Wotje in the
Marshall Islands, were tasked with reconnaissance to see how repairs
were progressing, and to bomb the important "Ten-ten" repair dock.
The distance involved required refueling en route, and was done from
submarines at French Frigate Shoals, 500 miles (800 km) north-west
of Pearl Harbor. Poor visibility hampered the mission, and the bombs
were dropped some miles from their target.
Five Japanese submarines supported the operation: I-9 as a radio
beacon; I-19, I-15 and I-26 to refuel the flying boats and I-23 to
provide weather reports. However, I-23 was lost without trace.
American ships were posted to the Shoals thereafter, which precluded
another attempt using the same approach. As a result, flying boats
were unable to conduct reconaissance prior to Midway, allowing
Fletcher to sortie undetected.
Immediate aftermath
Ninety minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbor began (December 7,
1941 Japan time, on the other side of the International Date Line),
Japan invaded British Malaya. This was followed by an early morning
attack on the New Territories of Hong Kong and within hours or days
by attacks on the Philippines, Wake Island, and Thailand and by the
sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse.[18]
American Response
President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Declaration of War
against Japan on the day following the attack.On December 8, 1941,
Roosevelt addressed a joint session of Congress, calling 7 December
1941 "a date which will live in infamy". Amid outrage at the attack
and the late delivery of the note breaking off relations, actions
considered treacherous, Congress declared war on Japan with
Jeannette Rankin (Republican of Montana) casting the only dissenting
vote. Roosevelt signed the declaration the same day. Continuing to
intensify its military mobilization, the U.S. government finished
converting to a war economy, a process begun by provision of weapons
to the Soviet Union and Great Britain.
The Pearl Harbor attack immediately galvanized a divided nation into
action. Public opinion had been moving towards support for entering
the war during 1941, but considerable opposition remained until the
Pearl Harbor attack. Overnight, Americans united against Japan, and
that response probably made possible the unconditional surrender
position later taken by the Allied Powers. Some historians believe
the attack on Pearl Harbor doomed Japan to defeat simply because it
awakened the "sleeping U.S. behemoth", regardless of whether the
fuel depots or machine shops had been destroyed or even if the
carriers had been caught in port and sunk. U.S. industrial and
military capacity, once mobilized, was able to pour overwhelming
resources into both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters. Others
believe Japanese trade protection was so incompetent, U.S.
submarines could have strangled Japan into defeat alone.
Perceptions of treachery in the attack before a declaration of war
sparked fears of sabotage or espionage by Japanese sympathizers
residing in the U.S., including citizens of Japanese descent and was
a factor in the subsequent Japanese internment in the western United
States. Other factors included misrepresentations of intelligence
information (none) suggesting sabotage, notably by General John
DeWitt, commanding Coast Defense on the Pacific Coast, who had
personal feelings against Japanese Americans. In February 1942,
Roosevelt signed United States Executive Order 9066, requiring all
Japanese Americans to submit themselves for arrest and internment.
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